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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JACOBSEN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
INC., a corporation; JELCO, INC., 
a corporation; and CENTRAL UTAH 
WATER CO~SERVANCY DISTRICT, 
a body corporate and politic, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
STRUCTO-LITE ENGINEERING, INC., 
a corporat~on, 
Defendant-Third-Party 
Plaintiff-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF A?PELL~~T 
NAT~RE Of THE CASE 
Case No. 16208 
This is an action for property loss a~d damages 
t~e eruption of a fiberglass che~ical tank. 
DISPOSITION IN LOI<'ER COURT 
This case ~as tr~ed to a jury in October and 
Novembe::::- of 1978. The Jury ret-.Jrned a Special Verdict finding 
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plaintiffs, Jacobsen Construction Company, Inc. and Jelco, 
Inc., twenty percent (20\) negligent in contributing to the 
loss complained of. The jury further found plaintiff, 
Central Utah Water Conservancy District, ten percent (10%) 
negligent in causing the loss, and defendant, Structo-Lite 
Engineering, Inc., seventy percent (70%) negligent in 
causing the damages complained of. The jury found damages 
to plaintiffs, Jacobsen-Jelco, in the amount of 5370,987.11, 
and to plaintiff, Central Utah Water Conservancy Cistrict, 
in the amount of 551,003.66. The lower court then entered 
judgment for the plaintiffs in the proportionate percentages 
as established by the comparative negligence interrogatory, 
plus costs. 
rELIEF SOUGHT OK APPEAL 
Defendant seeks a reversal of the judgment of the 
lower court and an entry of judoment for defendant and 
against plaintiffs, no cause of action. 
STATE~E~T OF FACTS 
At the ti~e of the accident in question, plaintiff 
J!cobsen Cc~~~~~c!icn Cc~re~y. Ir.c. (~e~eir.efter Jacobsen) 
and plaintiff Jelco, Inc. (here1nafter Jelco) were engaged 
1n a JC:~~ \'E~~~re f~r the constrcctic~ cf tne Jordan ~ater 
Purification Plant in Salt Lake County, State of tltah, under 
a written contract w1th plaintiff Central Utah ~ater Conser-
v d n cy D 1 s t r i c t ( J-: E r e i :-.a f t e r C c ;, 5 e r ·: c n c ~: [ 1 1 ~ t r 1 c t ) . 
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As part of the construction, Jacobsen and Jelco entered 
into a subcontract with defendant Structo-Lite Engineering, 
Inc. (hereinafter Structo-Lite), whereby Structo-Lite agreed 
to sell and deliver for installation in the project, six 
fiberglass chemical storage tanks to be built in accordance 
with the plans and specifications of the prime contract 
between Jacobsen-Jelco and Conservancy District. 
Defendant Structo-Lite constructed and delivered the 
six tanks which were then installed in the prime project by 
Jacobsen. Following the installation and completion of 
project construction, the tanks were filled with chemical 
solutions. Thereafter, one of the tanks containing an alum 
solution erupted and exploded, discharging the solution 
throughout the building which housed said tanks and causing 
extensive damage to the building, contents and e~uipment 
housed th~rein. 
Plaintiffs then brought this action alleging that 
defendant had caused the damaqe complained of through its 
negligent construction of the tanks; furthermore, that 
the tanks wer~ not built in accordnnce with the agreed 
upon specifications in breach of the contract itself and 
warra~ties connected to the contract. 
The case was tried to a jury which was in:tructed in 
standard coreparative negligence concepts and also as to the 
-3-
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doctrine of assumption of the risk. The instructions on 
assumption of the risk read as follow: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 17 
There is a legal principle commonly referred 
to by the term •assumption of risk", which is as 
follows: 
A company is said to assume risk when it 
voluntarily manifests its assent to the creation 
or maintenance of a dangerous condition and 
voluntarily exposes itself to that danger, or 
when it knows that a danQer exists in either the 
condition, use, or operation of property, and 
voluntarily accepts the dangerous condition and 
uses the dangerous product. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 18 
Distinction should be noted between the as-
sumption of risk just described and the ordinary 
and necessary acceptance of common risk such as 
surround us all and that lie in the possibility 
that other persons will not perform their duties 
toward us. As to this latter kind of every day 
risk, a company will not be barred from recovery 
by the fact, if it be a fact, that while it is 
exercisins ordinary care, and when the"e is nothing 
in the circumstances that either cautions it, or 
would caution a reasonably prudent person in like 
position to the contrary, it assumes that others 
will perform their duties of due care toward it 
and act on that assumption. 
A Special Verdict was then submitted to the jurors. 
In the answer to Special Interrogatory No. VIII, the jurors 
apportioned the comparative negligence of the parties as 
follows: 
Structo-Lite Engineering, Inc. 
Jacobsen-Jelco 
Conservancy District 
Templeton, Linke & Associates 
TOTKL 
70% 
20~ 
1 0 t 
Ot 
1 r r-c c { 
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In its.answer to Interrogatory No. VI of the Special 
Verdict. the jury also found that plaintiffs Jacobsen-Jelco 
had assumed the risk of the damages complained of. Tbe 
jury reached a similar finding as to plaintiff Conservancy 
District in the Answer to Interogatory No. VII. 
In light of such findings, defendent Structo-Lite 
moved the court to enter judgment of no cause of action in 
its favor and against plaintiffs. Said motion was denied 
and judgment was then entered for plaintiffs, in accordance 
with the percentages set out in the Special Verdict. 
Defendant now takes this appeal from the entry of 
that judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK IS STILL A COMPLETE 
BAR TO A PLAINTIFF'S RECOVERY IN A NEGLIGENCE 
ACTION IN THIS JURISDICTION. 
The primary issue herein concerns the present status 
of the doctrine kno~n as "assu~ption of the risk." The 
trial jury was properly instructed regarding the doctrine 
and thereafter returned an affirmative answer to the Special 
Verdict Interrogatory asking whether plaintiff had assumed 
the risk of the damages complained of. 
Prior to the enactment of the Utah Comparative Negligence 
Act, Section 78-27-37, ~~~h Code Ann. (1973), there is no 
ouestion but ~hat the jurors' verdict would ~ave operated to 
-5-
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totally bar any recovery by plaintiffs. Defendant contends 
that tbt aame result inures despite passage of the Compara-
tive Negligence Act. Yet defendant admits that the actual 
wording of the Act is susceptible to several interpretations. 
The statue itself reads: 
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery 
in any action by any person or his legal repre-
sentative, to recover damages for negligence 
or gross negligence resulting in death or in-
jury to person or property, if such negligence 
was not as great as the negligence or gross 
negligence of the person against whom recovery 
is sought, but any damages allowed shall be 
diminished in the proportion to the amount of 
negligence attributable to the person recovering. 
As used in this Act, 'contributory negligence' 
includes 'assu~ption of risk.' 
Plaintiffs' alternative reading of the statute is that 
the last sentence abolishes assumption of risk as a separate 
defense and brings it within the a~bit of co~parative negli-
gence. Consequently, the factual co~ponents of an assumption 
of risk defense are now to be compared with other actions of 
the parties to deter~ine what perc~ntaqe of fault such actions 
comprise. 
Defendant contends that such a reading of the statue 
equates assu~ption of the risk with contributory negl1gence, 
a conclusion not substantiated in the case law of this juris-
diction. Assu~ptlon of the r1sk and contr1butory negligence 
have long been recognized in t~1s jurisdict1on as distlnctly 
separate defenses, and both ~ay be sub~itted to a jury if a 
-6-
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sufficient evidentiary basis for the defenses is established. 
Kuchenm~ister v. Los Angeles • s. L. R. Co., 52 Dtah 111, 
172 P. 725 (1918). 
However, just as an accident can give rise to recovery 
theories based upon negligence, warranty, and contract, ao aay 
such accident have a factual basis to sustain the defenses 
of both assumption of risk and contributory negligence, 
thereby creating an area of overlapping defense. It is this 
last area referred to--where both defenses are applicable--
that has created the confusion reqarding assumption of risk. 
To understand how the defenses overlap, it is first 
necessary to examine the distinctive characteristics of the 
two defenses. Dean William L. Prosser classifies the cases 
dealing with assumption of risk into three broad basic types 
of situations. The third situation described is the case at 
hand. In it: 
[T]he plaintiff, aware of a risk already created 
by the negligence of the defendant, proceeds 
voluntarily to encounter it--as where he has been 
supplied with a chattel which he knows to be 
unsafe and proceeds to use it after he has dis-. 
covered the danger. If this is a voluntary ch~lce, 
it mav be fo~nd that he has accepted the s1tua.1o~, 
and c;nsented to relieve the defendant of his duty. 
Prosser, The Law of Torts (4th ed. 1971) at 440 (e~phasis 
added I . 
Assumption of risk, then, is a matter of kno10ledge of 
the danger and intelligent acquiescence in it. Contributory 
-7-
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negligence, on the the other hand, is a matter of some fault 
or departure from the standard of conduct of the reasonable 
man, however unaware, unwilling, or even protesting the 
plaintiff may be. As is readily seen, there will be many 
aituations where the two doctrines intersect or overlap. 
Obviously the two may co-exist when the plaintiff 
makes an unreasonable choice to incur the risk: 
but either may exist without the other. The 
significant difference, when there is one, is 
likely to be one between risks which were in fact 
known to the plaintiff, and risks which he merely 
might have discovered by the exercise of ordinary 
care. 
Prosser, The Law of Torts, supra, at 441. 
The distinction bet~een the tw~ defenses, as delineated 
by Professor Prosser, has long been established in this 
jurisdiction. As early as 1918, the Utah Supreme Court 
noted the potentional overlaF of the defenses and the need 
for distinguishing them in Kuchenrreister v. Los Anaeles & 
S. L. R. Co., 52 Utah 116, 172 P. 725 (1918). Citing with 
approval the early English Common Law decision of Thomas v. 
Quarterrr,ain, L.R. 18, Q.B. Div., the court wrote: 
But the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria 
[ass~~ed risk, s~a~~s outside the de!e~se of 
contributory negligence and is in no way limited 
by it. In indl\'idual instances, the t.,·o ideas 
sometimes see!1' to cover the sa-e aro~e1d, but 
ca~el~~s~eEs lS ~:~ t~.e ~~-~ ~~~~~ 2£ 1~:e:l1g~~~ 
choice. 
Kuchenmeister v. Lcs ~nceles S. L. R. Cc., ~, at 729 
(italics omitted). 
-E-
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Id. 
Further on in that same opinion, the court stated1 
It needs no argument, therefore, to demonstrate 
that while in a particular ease facts may be 
such as to justify a finding of both contributory 
negligence and assumption of risk, yet contributory 
negligence does not necessarily arise from intelli-
gent choice, and therefore is not necessarily 
included in assumption of risk •••• 
The distinction continued. In Clay v. Dunford, 121 
Utah 177, 239 P.2d 1075, 1077 (1952) the court noted the 
correctness of the converse of the proposition: "Further-
more, plaintiffs' failure to exercise ordinary care to 
discover the danger is not properly a matter of assumption 
of risk, but of the defense of contributory negligence.• 
Yet, however clear the distinction may appear to be 
in light of the aforecited authorities, it has been consis-
tently muddied in application. Until the advent of co~para-
tive negligence, both contributory negligence and assumption 
of risk were complete bars to a plaintiff's recovery. In 
cases where both theories were applicable--the overlap area 
previously referred to--the resultant outcomes would be 
identical under either theory. As such, there was no press-
ing need to distinguish between the theories. Predictably, 
the theories were often confused. Some cases found a plain-
tiff to have assu~ed risk when he failed to use reasonable 
care to discover the danger. In others, a faulty assumption 
-9-
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of risk defense still was found sufficient to comprise con-
tributory negligence and therefore bar recovery. In short, 
one man's assumption of risk became another's contributory 
negligence. The results were, understandably, confused 
and often times irreconcilable. 
It is upon this backdrop that the Utah Legislature 
authored the Utah Comparative Negligence Act. Apparently 
distraught with not only the injustices wrought by the con-
tributory negligence doctrine, but also with the chameleon-
like manner in which assumption of risk became contributory 
negligence in many of the overlap cases, the Utah Legisla-
ture attempted to remedy the confusion. By doing so, it 
enqendered ~ore confusion. The question arose whether the 
legislature intended to totally abolish assumption of risk 
as a defense in this jurisdiction, or only to the extent 
that it tracks the doctrine of contributory negligence. If 
the legislature indeed intended to abolish the doctrine 
entirely, defendant contends that the word1ng of the statute 
would be, "Contributory negliaence and assumption of risk 
8hall not ~a~ reco~er~· . De!e~~a~t feels t~at the 
lumpina of assumption of risk with contributory negliaence 
recognize the distinction between the doctrines and to only 
pull that part of assumption of risk which truly equates 
with contributory necligence into the a-bit and rule of 
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comparative fault. !!! Becker v. Beaverton School District 
No.4B, 551 P.2d 498 (Or.App. 1976): Thompson v. Weaver, 560 
P.2d 620 (Or. 1977), discussed infra. 
Defendant readily admits that there is little evidence 
as to whether the legislature even recognized the distinc-
tion between the doctrine of contributory negligence and 
assumption of risk. The statute itself is unclear and sus-
ceptible of either interpretation. And in only one instance 
since the passage of the Comparative Negligence Act has the 
Utah Court directly dealt with this problem. In Rigtrup v. 
Strawberry ~ater Users Association, 563 P.2d 1247 (Utah 
1977) the plaintiff-appellant Rigtrup contended on appeal 
that the trial court had erred by instructing the jury as to 
assumption of risk after it had adequately instr~cted on 
contributory neglioence. In affirming the trial court's 
action, the Supreme Court stated: 
Though there have been some differences in 
view as to the defense of assumption of risk and 
its relation to other aspects of contribJtory 
negliqence, it has since time immemorial been 
regarded as a valid defense in the law of this 
state. It has sometimes been said to be bJt a 
soecialized asoect of contribJtory neglicence in 
that it can be. intermingled and fused with other 
aspects thereof in certain circumstances. It is 
also s0~etirn.es said to be somethino separate from 
contributory negligence, as 1t und~Jbtedly can be 
in so;r,e c1rcur:1stances. Ho,.·ever, it requires but 
little reflection to see that where there is a 
known dancer, the risk of which is voluntarily 
assumed by a party such action may well fall 
within the lack of due care which constitutes 
-11-
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neqligeoce and also mav be correctly termed an 
assumpt1on ot r1s~. It such be the s1tuat1on, 
the party should be charged with the responsi-
b1~ity for his conduct by whatever term it may 
be called; and the comparative negligence statute 
quoted above should be applied as the trial court 
correctly did in this case. 
* * * 
Reflection back upon the facts recited herein 
will reveal that there was sufficient basis in 
the evidence from which a jury could reasonably 
believe that the plaintiffs were aware of a known 
danger because of their inadequate wiring, and 
that they voluntarily persisted in assuming the 
risk of such an occurrence as did finally happen. 
Consequently, the trial court was justified in 
giving the instruction of assumption of risk. 
Rigtrup v. Strawberry 'Vlater Users Association, ~· at 
1 25 0-51 • 
The Rigtrup case clearly holds that assumption of risk 
is still a viable defense in this jurisdiction. The issue 
then becomes whether the defense operates as a complete bar 
to a plaintiff's recovery or whether its component elements 
are to be weiahed in the computation of comparative fault, 
alona with the component elements previously aiving rise to 
a contributory nealigence defense. While some dicta in the 
opinion su~aests the latter as the rule, case holdings 
suagest the former is correct. The s~preme Court held that 
assumption of risk instructions. Those lnstructions, at-
tached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by 
this reference, estatlish assu~~tion cf risk as a co~~lete 
-12-
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bar to recovery in a negligence action where a plaintiff 
voluntarily assumes the risk of a known danger. 
This construction of the Utah Comparative Negligence 
Act finds further support in Becker v. Beaverton School 
District No.4B, 551 P.2d 498 (Or.App. 1976). In~. the 
Oregon Court of Appeals held that the Oregon Comparative 
Negligence Statute did not bar the defense of assumption of 
risk absolutely. The Oregon and Utah Comparative Negligence 
Statutes are substantially the same. The court therein 
stated: 
We hold that the ••• comparative negli-
gence statute ... aFplied only to assumption of 
the risk in its secondary sense. The wording of 
the statute suggests this. As noted above, the 
statute provided: 
"Contributory negligence, includ1ng 
assumption of the risk, shall not bar 
recovery in an action ••• if such negli-
gence contributing to the injury was not 
as areat as the nealiaence of the oerson 
against whom recovery- is sought • : •• • 
ORS. 18.470 (1973). 
The choice of the term "such negligence" 
in the second clause of the statute required the 
term "contributory negligence" or its equivalent 
as an antecedent. Therefore, we conclude that the 
~~r2~~ "i~:l~~i~a ass~~~tion of the risk'' ~as 
~erely used as a-synonym for "contributory negli-
aence", the words immediately preceding the 
phrase. See, v. Schwartz, Cowcarative Necliaence, 
160 §9.2,--(-1974). Since the statute ala not apply 
to assu~ption of the risk in its primary se~se ~nd 
since defendant pleaded assumption of the r1sk 1n 
that sense, it would not have been proper for the 
trial court to give plaintiff's requested instruc-
tions on comparative negligence. Under ORS. 18.470 
-13-
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(1973), assumption of the risk in its primary sense 
remained a complete bar to a negligence action. 
Becker v. Beaverton School Dist. No. 48, supra, at 502. 
The reasoning of Becker applies just as readily in 
Utah. Utah's Comparative Negligence Statute differs from 
the Oregon statute only in that the inclusion of assumption 
of the risk within the term contributory negligence is 
stated in a separate sentence rather than in a clause. 
Otherwise the language is identical. 
The Oregon statute has since been amended. It now 
flatly declares: 
The doctrine of applied assu~ption of the 
risk is abolished. 
Or.Rev.Stat. S18.475(2). 
As pointed out in Thompson v. ~eaver, 560 P.2d 620, 623 
(Or. 1977), the new statute abolishes assumption of the risk 
as a basis for barring recovery. The Oreaon Leaislature 
felled the doctrine in toto. Hov;ever, the passage of the 
a~endment itself would seem to indicate that the legislature 
recognized that the pre-amendment statute did not abolish 
assu~ption of risk excep~ as it O\'erla~~E~ c:~trit~tcr~· 
negligence, in accord with the reasoning of Becker. 
parative Negl1gence Statute are clearly analogous to the 
case at hand. The court in Riatruo recognized that an 
instruction statina that as8urr~tio~ of the risk in its 
- 1 ~-
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proper sense, may still act as a complete bar to a plain-
tiff's recovery is proper. The reasoning of Becker suggeata 
that Utah's Comparative Negligence Act is as reasonably 
susceptible to differing interpretations as was Oregon's. 
While a change in Utah law may, arguendo, be beneficial, 
such change is to be brought about legislatively, as in the 
Oregon situation, and not judicially. This fact was prop-
erly recognized by the Rigtrup court. 
{W)e decline the invitation to so change our law. 
One of the important values in our system which 
tends to produce confidence in and respect for 
the law is that the law as it is declared and 
known has sufficient solidarity and continuity 
that it can be relied on with assurance. We 
think that those objectives are best served by 
the judicial branch refraining from legislating 
any abrupt or drarr.atic changes of a substantial 
nature in the law and by leaving any such changes 
therein to the legislature, whose constltutional 
prerogative it is. 
Rigtrup v. Stra~berry Kater Users Association, 563 P.2d 
1247, 1250 (Utah 1977). 
Until the Utah legislature chooses to abolish the 
defense of assumption of risk as a complete bar in a negli-
gence action, it should be maintained and upheld by the 
state trial courts. The doctrine is not a confusing dupli-
cation of contrib~tory ne~ligence where properly analyzed, 
but is a distinctive legal concept. As Prosser states: 
~here the plaintiff acts unreasonably in 
making his choice, it is said that their {sic) 
is merely one form of contributory negligence 
-15-
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which is certainly true: and from this it is 
argued that there is, or should be no distinction 
between the two defenses and that there is only 
useless and confusing duplication. But this 
is a distinctive kind of contributory negligence, 
in which the plaintiff knows the risk and volun-
tarily accepts it: and it has been held to differ 
from contributory negligence which merely fails 
to discover the danger in several minor respects. 
Thus assumption of risk is governed by the sub-
jective standard of the plaintiff himself, whereas 
contributory negligence is measured by the objec-
tive standard of the reasonable man. 
Prosser, The Law of Torts, (4th ed. 1971) at 456. 
POINT II 
IF ASSUMPTION OF RISK REMAINS AS A 
BAR TO AN ACTION FOR NEGLIGENCE, IT 
ALSO REMAINS AS A CO~PLETE BAR TO 
A CAUSE OF ACTION BASED IN K~RRA~TY. 
The trial jury found defendant to have breached 
its warranty (or contract) 1 to plaintiff and that such 
breach was a proxirrate cause of the da~ages suffered by 
plaintiff. 
Inasmuch as the jurors also found that plaintiff 
had assumed the risk of the damages complained of, it is 
necessary to deter~ine whether t~e bar to recovery imposed 
by the assumption of risk doctrine 1n a negligence action, 
1
under the Uniform Com~ercial Code, sales by description 
cf aoods are to be treate~ as ex~~e~~ ~2rrarties if ~ad~ 
part of tr.e ta.sis of the t·aroa1n·. Section /C.;-2-313, Uta~ 
Code Ann. (1965). The descriPtion need not be by words 
Eut can be bv tE'c~nica~ SCE'c"f"ca:: ions as in tt'.e present 
matter. As~ result, suit brouqht upon the contract for 
failure to corrply with the contract spec1fications is 
equivalent to a suit for breacr of exPress warranty, and 
the Ja~ r~:~~i~~ tc cases c~ ~x;~Ess ~~rra~tv a;;:~~£. 
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as discussed above, is equally applicable in an action based 
on warr.anty, 
A case law survey by two of the leading authorities in 
the area of sales transactions finds that it is so appli-
cable. While jurisdictions are split as to whether con-
tributory negligence is a defense in a warranty cause of 
action, the "courts are in unanimous agreement that the 
egregious form of contributory negligence called 'assumption 
of the risk' bars plaintiff's recovery in strict tort and in 
warranty". White and Summers, Unifor~ Commercial Code 
(1972) at 336. 
It is of more than passing interest that the authors of 
the Restatement of Torts 2d also recognized the distinction 
between assumption of risk and contributory negligence and 
felt the conceptual differences in the defenses to be great 
enou~h, and the doctrinal defense of assumption of risk 
i~portant eno~gh, that they retained ass~~ption of risk as a 
co"~lete bar and one of the fe~ defenses to a strict lia-
bility action, yet disallowed similar treatment for con-
Restatement of Torts 2d reads in pertinent part: 
Cc~~rit~tory ~e;!igence of the plaintiff is not 
a defense when such negligence consists merely 
of the failure to discover the defect in the 
product, or to auard aaainst the possibility of 
its existence. -On the-other hand, the fonr. of 
-11-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
contributory negligence which consists in in-
voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to en-
c~nter a known danger, and commonly passes under 
the name of assumption of risk, is a defense under 
this Section as in other cases of strict liability. 
If the user or consumer discovers the defect and 
is aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds 
unreasonably to make use of the product and is 
injured by it, he is barred from recovery. 
As the foregoing illustrates, not only has assumption 
of risk historically been a complete defense to a warranty 
action as well as a negligence action, but the leading 
authorities in the field strongly feel that it should be 
~ preserved, despite the abolition of the contributory negli-
\ gence defense. 
POINT III 
SINCE A PROPERLY INSTRUCTED TRIAL JURY 
FOUND THAT PLAINTIFFS HAD ASSUMED THE RISK 
OF THE DAMAGES COMPLAINED OF, DEFENDANT 
WAS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT ON THE VERDICT 
AS A ~ATTER OF LAW AND THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FAILURE TO ENTER SUCH JUDG~ENT WAS ERROR. 
The trial jury received proper instructions by the 
court concerning the doctrine of assumption of risk. As set 
forth in the Statement of facts, Instruction No. 17 and 
Instruction No. 18 make the proper distinction between true 
assumption of risk cases in which the pla1ntiff has actual 
knowledge of the dan~er and the quasi-contributory ne~li-
gence sjtuation where the danger could have been recognized 
through the use of ordinary care. 
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It is true that the instructions do not state defen-
dant's theory that assumption of risk, in the sense urged, 
is a complete bar to recovery. Such omission was intentional, 
for apprising the jury of the effect of the finding that 
plaintiff had assumed the risk of the damage would violate 
the rule set down in McGinn v. Utah Power & Light Co., 529 
P.2d 423 (Utah 1974)--that instructing a jury as to the effect 
effect or impact that its fact-finding answers, in a Special 
Verdict, "'ill have on the outcome of a corr.parative negligence 
case is prejudicial error. 
Under such instructions, the jury returned a Special 
Verdict finding that plaintiff had indeed assumed the risk 
of the damages complained of. 
In light of such finding the defendant was entltled to 
a judgment of no cause of action on the Verdict as a matter 
of law. The trial court's denial of defe~dant's motion for 
such a Verdict was, therefore, in error. 
COt\CLUSION 
In light of the foregoing authorities, defendant, 
~~~~etc-Lite Encineering, Inc., rEspectfully re~~ests that 
the verdict of the trial court in the herein matter be 
reversed and that a judgment of no cause of action be 
entered· for the defendant and against the plaintiffs. 
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Reapectfully submitted this / 7~ay of May, 1979. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
. 
By ( c·-. '-==·:....· __ 
H. James cfegg """ 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Structo-Lite Engineering, Inc. 
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